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Abstract We explicate the thesis of logical relativism (people of dierent
cultures may have dierent logics) in logical terms. Our illustrations
come from the eld of paraconsistent logic.
1 Introduction
Logical relativism is the claim that
People of dierent cultures may have specically dierent logics
(for example, [there may be] a peculiarly Chinese logic distinct
from Western logics). [15]
Logical relativism was rather popular in anthropological circles before the
Second World War [10, 13, 14]. It then went out of fashion [7]. The thesis
is currently undergoing a revival in the so-called Strong Programme in the
sociology of knowledge [2, 12].
There is no evidence that there actually exist cultures which adhere to
dierent logics than we do [23, 24]. The thesis of logical relativism is never-
theless interesting in itself. What does it mean to say that somebody follows
some particular logic? What does it mean to say that people follow dier-
ent logics? How should such claims be understood? These are the issues
which we shall address. Our enterprise is uncommon in that we shall try
to clarify these issues in logical terms. To the best of our knowledge, this
is something which anthropologists, logicians and sociologists of knowledge
have never tried to do.
2 Standard Doxastic Logic
When talking about the logical properties of other peoples’ opinions, it is
natural to turn one’s attention to doxastic logic, the logic of belief [11, 18].
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It is, however, impossible to make sense of the relativists’ claim in terms of
standard doxastic logic.
Standard doxastic logic is based on modal system K . This system has,
amongst others, the following rules. C stands for classical propositional logic.
R1 ‘C  =) ‘K  ;
R2 ‘C !  =) ‘K !  ;
R3 ‘C    =) ‘K    .
Reading  as \the agent believes that  ," these rules imply (1) that all
agents believe all classical tautologies, and (2) that agents’ beliefs are closed
under C-provable consequence, and (3) that if an agent believes that  , he
also believes all propositions which are C-provably equivalent with  . Thus
standard doxastic logic portrays all doxastic agents as followers of classical
logic. When one wants to deal with logical relativism, one has to adopt a
less parochial outlook.
Romane Clark has written that belief-ascription is
mainly a matter of keeping the references and concepts of those
of us who are scribes, recording the occurrences of psychical hap-
penings, distinct from those of the agents to whom we ascribe
mental events. [6]
The logical relativist seems committed to the claim that belief-ascription
involves keeping the agents’ and our own logics distinct as well. Just as
8x8y(x = y ! (Fx  Fy)) is not an acceptable principle of doxastic
logic, so ‘C    =) ‘    is, from the relativist’s perspective, not
acceptable either.
3 Adhering to a Particular Logical System
What does it mean to say that somebody adheres to a particular logical
system? In the literature about logical relativism, this expression is used in
at least two quite dierent senses. First, it is sometimes said that people may
adhere to dierent logics in the sense of embracing dierent sets of logical
truths (see, e.g., [24]). Second, it is sometimes said that people may adhere
to dierent logics in the sense of following dierent logical rules (see, e.g.,
[12]). The rst conception of adherence to a logic seems related to R1 above,
whereas the second seems closer to R2 and R3. We accordingly propose the
following three denitions:
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Def. 1 The agent adheres1 to logical system X according to logical system
Y i ‘X  =) ‘Y  .
Def. 2 The agent adheres2 to logical system X according to logical system
Y i ‘X !  =) ‘Y !  .
Def. 3 The agent adheres3 to logical system X according to logical system
Y i ‘X    =) ‘Y    .
These senses of \adherence to a logic" should be carefully distinguished from
each other, as the following example makes vivid.
Let C be the complement of the propositional calculus, i.e., the set of all
non-theorems of C . This system has been axiomatized as follows ([4]; see
also [3, 25, 26]).
A1 p! :p (p atomic)
A2 :p! p (p atomic)
R1a =p!  (p atomic, p does not occur in )
R1b =:p!  (p atomic, p does not occur in )
R2 !  =! (!  )
R3 !  =(! ) !  
R4 :!  =(! ) !  
R5 :!  =
R6 !  =::!  
R7 ! ( ! )= ! (! )
R8  ! S;: ! S=:( !  ) ! S , where S is of the form S = Si or
S = S1 ! (S2 ! : : : (Sn−1 ! Sn) : : :), with Si = pi or Si = :pi ,
pi 6= pk for i 6= k , and p 2 fp1; p2; : : : ; png for all p which occur in
!  .
C is perfectly unsound and completely antitautological in the sense that ‘C 
i 6j=C  [4]. It will be clear that C is paraconsistent (it contains all logical
falsehoods but no logical truths) and non-monotonic.
Now dene C+C as follows.
 Axioms: All classical tautologies.
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 Rules:
1. ‘C  =) ‘C+C  ;
2. 0C  =) ‘C+C : ;
3. Modus Ponens.
It will be clear that an agent whose beliefs are described by this system
does not adhere to classical logic in the sense of Def. 1. Nor does he adhere
to classical logic in the sense of Def. 2, for we have ‘C ? ! > but not
‘C+C ? ! >. The agent does however adhere to classical logic in the
sense of Def. 3. For suppose that ‘C    . It follows that ‘C  i ‘C  ,
whence ‘C  i ‘C  . So either (1) ‘C  and ‘C  or (2) 0C  and 0C  .
In the rst case, we have ‘C+C  and ‘C+C  , whence ‘C+C ^ 
and hence ‘C+C    ; in the second case, we have ‘C+C : and
‘C+C : , whence ‘C+C : ^ : and hence ‘C+C    . So
we have ‘C+C    in any case, QED.
It is not dicult to contrive systems in which an agent adheres to a
particular logic in the sense of one of the other denitions. One may for
example use the logic of awareness discussed in [11], x9.5.
4 Adherence to Dierent Logical Systems
What does it mean to say that two agents adhere to dierent logics? We
propose the following three denitions, corresponding to Defs. 1{3 above.
i means that agent i believes that  .
Def. 4 Agents i and k adhere1 to dierent logics according to logical system
X i it is not the case that ‘X i () ‘X k .
Def. 5 Agents i and k adhere2 to dierent logics according to logical system
X i it is not the case that ‘X i! i () ‘X k! k .
Def. 6 Agents i and k adhere3 to dierent logics according to logical system
X i it is not the case that ‘X i  i () ‘X k  k .
The following systems illustrate the notion of several agents each following
his own logic in the senses of all three denitions. They are simplied versions
of the systems discussed in [16].
Each system Ci+(Ck)0k<! , 0  i < ! , is dened as follows.
 Axioms: All axioms of Ci , i.e., the i-th system in Da Costa’s well-
known paraconsistent hierarchy [8], plus k(!  ) ! (k! k ),
for all k , 0  k < ! .
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 Rules: Modus Ponens and ‘Ck  =) ‘ k , for all k , 0  k < ! .
It is obvious that in each system Ci+(Ck)0k<! , all agents k , m, k 6= m,
adhere to dierent logics in the senses of Defs. 4{6.
Actually, the agents adhere to dierent logics in an even stronger sense of
the word. Following [21], one may call Γ a theory of X i Γ is closed under
conjunction and Modus Ponens. One may then observe that each agent k
adheres to Ck in the sense that for all theories Γ of Ci+(Ck)0k<! and all
sequences  of doxastic operators, f: k 2 Γg is a theory of Ck . Agents
adhere to classical logic in the same strong sense in standard doxastic logic.
We think that the just-described systems capture the thesis of logical
relativism in a particularly clear way. Borrowing a term from [21], we may
say that the operators k have a \guarding" function in these systems:
they serve to isolate the agents’ logics from each other. The systems may
of course be extended to deal with adherents of  Lukasiewicz’s multi-valued
calculi, intuitionists, and so on and so forth.
We want to emphasize that it is no accident that we have twice chosen
to illustrate logical relativism by means of paraconsistent systems. The lit-
erature about logical relativism is usually concerned with the acceptance or
rejection of contradictions. As Levy-Bruhl wrote, \the primitive mind is not
constrained above all else, as ours is, to avoid contradictions. What to our
eyes is impossible or absurd, it sometimes will admit without seeing any dif-
culty" [14]. \It does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to avoiding
contradiction" [13]. Levy-Bruhl would apparently have regarded paraconsis-
tent logic and dialetheism as manifestations of primitive mentality!
5 Imaginary Worlds
In an \ontological" formulation, logical relativism is the claim that
people of other cultures live in other worlds, so that what is ra-
tional in their world may well appear irrational in ours. . . The
relativist slogan, that people of dierent cultures live in dierent
worlds, would be nonsense if understood as literally referring to
physical worlds. If understood as referring to cognized worlds,
it would overstate a very trivial point. . . If, however, the worlds
referred to are cognizable worlds, then the claim need be neither
empty nor absurd. [22]
We may explicate this claim in terms of the semantics of the systems we have
described.
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We do not have to refer to non-classical worlds when giving a semantical
account of C+C . A variation on the usual neighborhood semantics of
classical modal systems (see, e.g., [5]) suces. For let us dene a C+C-
model as a structure M = (W;C;N; V ), where W is a set, C W , N :W 7!
PP(W ), and V : WFF  W 7! f0; 1g , which satises the following two
conditions (NB: jj df= fw 2W :V (; w) = 1g): (1) N(w) = fjj: 9M: jj
M
6=
W
M
g ; (2) if  is not of the form  , then V (; w) behaves like the valuation
function of classical logic; on the other hand, if  =  and w 2 C , then
V (; w) = 1 i j j 2 N(w). Denition: j=
M

df
= C  jj . It will be clear
that ‘C+C  i j=M  for all C+C-models M .
In contrast to the semantics of C+C , those of Ci+(Ck)0k<! , 0 
i < ! , are most easily specied in terms of dierent classes of worlds,
many of them non-classical. A Ci+(Ck)0k<! -model is a structure M =
((Wk)0k<!;Wi; R; V ), where each Wk is a set, R  W W , where W =S
0k<! Wk , and V : WFF W 7! f0; 1g is such that if w 2 Wk , then if 
is not of the form i , then V (; w) is like the valuation function of Da
Costa’s system Ck (see [9]); on the other hand, if  = i , then V (; w) =
minfV ( ;w0):w0 2 Wi and wRw0g . j=M  means that V (; w) = 1 for
all w 2 Wi . It can be proven that ‘Ci+(Ck)0k<!  i j=M  for all
Ci+(Ck)0k<! -models M [16].
Thus, there are several types of worlds in the semantics of Ci+(Ck)0k<! .
Only the worlds which are of the agent’s own type matter as to what he be-
lieves. The other worlds are beyond his logical horizon. This seems a nice
explication of both the relativists’ claims about dierent \cognizable" worlds
and Vasil’ev’s speculations about \imaginary worlds" where our logic does
not hold (see [1, 20, 27, 28]). The \ontological" relativist claim seems to
come down to the assertion that other agents’ beliefs may well have to be
modelled by worlds which we deem impossible.
As Montaigne put it in a dierent context:
Or, s’il y a plusieurs mondes, comme Epicurus et presque toute la
philosophie a pense, que scavons nous si les principes et les regles
de cettuy touchent pareillement les autres? Ils ont a l’avanture
autre visage et autre police. [19]
6 Adjacent Territory
Without going so far as to claim that everything is relative, we want to point
out that the ideas we have presented are not only relevant in connection
with doxastic logic. They may also be applied to, for instance, deontic logic
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(dierent cultures may not only have dierent norms, e.g., in the way out-
lined in [17]: they may also have dierent ways of judging adherence to these
norms), truth in ction (one should not judge the works of, for example, intu-
itionists by our|classical or, as the case may be, paraconsistent|standards)
and alethic modal logic (the concepts of necessity and possibility are logic-
relative). Some of the details may be found in [16]; we leave the rest to the
hopefully imaginative reader.
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